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Abstract
As significant increases in the financing of infrastructure and other resources will 
still be required to bridge the current infrastructure gap experienced globally, 
alternatives to the standard PPP infrastructure project delivery models are 
constantly appraised in several nations. This research examined the viability of 
reframing Public Private Partnership (PPP) frameworks as hybrid PPP alliances 
(HPPPA), which would enhance current PPP practices and enable practitioners in 
South Africa to deliver PPP infrastructure projects more efficiently. The research 
adopted a two-pronged qualitative data collection approach, utilizing semi-
structured interviews as well as case studies to obtain empirical evidence that 
was compared to secondary data on how PPP practices in South Africa can be 
enhanced. The research established that while the South African PPP legislations 
was adjudged as being suitable, the delivery framework was found to be highly 
costly and comprised of long approval processes.
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Introduction
While South Africa stands as the most progressive public-private partnership (PPP) 
country in Africa, arguments still remain as to whether PPP has achieved its 
intended objectives (Seeletse, 2016). According to Grimsey and Lewis (2005), one 
reason for this stems from the lack of universal congruence on the definition of 
PPP. This in turn makes it open to diverse interpretations and in some cases a pas-
sive approach from the public sector during the delivery process. Despite the lack 
of congruence on the PPP concept, Fombad (2014) posited that perhaps the establish-
ment of a formal PPP structure within the National Treasury provided fundamental 
guidance on how best to explicate the concept within the context of South Africa. 
Accordingly, the National Treasury (2007) defined PPP in South Africa as “a contract 
between a government institution and a private party, where the private party per-
forms an institutional function and/or uses state property in terms of output specifica-
tions; substantial project risk (financial, technical, operational) is transferred to the 
private party; and the private party benefits through unitary payments from govern-
ment budgets and/or user fees.” The South African National Treasury (2012) disclosed 
that many public entities fail to execute their planning mandates and spend infrastruc-
ture budget due to lack of management and technical capacity. National Development 
Plan 2030 (NDP, 2012) concurred that the state had committed substantial funding to 
public infrastructure to address backlogs, but not all of it had been spent. Development 
Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA, 2012) advised that South Africa’s focus for the next 
10 years should be to redress economic infrastructure backlogs and inadequacies that 
impede economic growth. National Development Plan 2030 (NDP, 2012) informs that 
infrastructure investment, as a percentage of gross domestic products needed to grow 
to 30% by 2030.
From the above, lack of infrastructure delivery may not be due to shortage of capi-
tal finance alone, as many public entities have failed to execute their planning man-
dates and infrastructure budget due to lack of management and technical capacity NDP 
(2012). In South Africa for instance, the National Planning Commission (n.d.) identi-
fied that due to poverty, many households are unable to afford the cost of services 
while limited human and financial resources to deliver services could still be classed 
among other concerns affecting the lack of infrastructure delivery. Zhang et al. (2015) 
argued that questions still remain as to how to cultivate a facilitating institutional envi-
ronment for developing PPP projects success. National Treasury (2018) found that in 
order to increase the delivery of PPP there is a need to streamline its implementation 
to reduce project lifecycle and ease regulatory regime so that it is less cumbersome for 
stakeholders (NDP, 2012). Zou et al. (2014) pointed out that PPP’s success depends on 
selecting the “right” team and building good relationships throughout the project life-
cycle. National Treasury (2018) established that in order to build a bankable pipeline 
of PPP projects, the public sector must change their passive approach to be able to 
effectively implement, manage and monitor such projects (NDP, 2012).
Koolwijk (2010) found that in Australia, alliancing is embedded in other con-
tracting systems known as hybrid alliance characterized by allocating certain risks 
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rather than total sharing or transfer which is similar to the observation made on two 
Dutch cases of hybrid alliancing. Clifton and Duffield (2006) examined means of 
improving private finance initiative (PFI)/PPP and concluded that improved value 
for money would be realized through the application of alliancing principles. This 
was due to the flexible structure for management of change via a hybrid public-pri-
vate partnership alliance (HPPPA), which provided a mechanism for managing 
long-term outcomes whilst maintaining the original commercial intent of a PPP. 
Snopko (2014) identified PPP and hybrid projects as an effective method for financ-
ing local government investment projects in the European Union. In the “rationale 
for the development of innovative PPP’s conducted by WEF (2014)”, it was recom-
mended that the role of the public sector remained vital in the success of PPP and 
innovative partnerships with the private sector. It was also contended that civil soci-
ety actors needed to educate and encourage society in order to change the perspec-
tive toward PPP (Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015; European PPP 
Expertise Centre, 2011; WEF, 2014).
One explanation offered for HPPPA is that it enables governments take advantage 
of their ability to raise financing at reduced rates than might not be the case for the 
private sector. Furthermore, given the scale of the global infrastructure deficit, Ochieng 
et al. (2020) advocated the need embrace innovative strategies for financing infra-
structure. Therefore, the need to develop more flexible and collaborative forms of 
infrastructure delivery in South Africa that can better meet the objectives of both the 
public, private partners and other stakeholders while still achieving cost-effective 
infrastructure remains crucial. Consequently, the aim of this research was to examine 
the viability of reframing PPP projects as HPPPA framework, to enhance current PPP 
practices and enable practitioners in SA to deliver PPP projects efficiently. The study 
contributes to a theoretical enhancement of the existing PPP infrastructure literature, 
achieved by proposing HPPPA framework. The study provides sufficient empirical 
evidence which indicates that effective and efficiency in PPP infrastructure delivery 
can be achieved by infusing alliancing principles. This would reduce project delivery 
duration, cost and enhance a collaborative approach toward PPP project delivery. The 
remainder of this article is structured to provide a review of the SA PPP framework 
and PPP success factors. Subsequent sections explain the research method, findings, 
discussion, and conclusions.
South Africa Public Partnership Framework
Zhang et al. (2015) argued that in as much as there are diverse opinions on the defi-
nition of PPP, it still carries a vague construct that is very general in nature based on 
different countries or organizations tied to their industrial synthesis. The South 
Africa Public-Private Partnership Manual (2004) defined a PPP as a contract between 
public and private entities in which the private partner assumes substantial financial, 
technical, and operational risk in the design, financing, building, and operation of a 
project. It is worth noting that this definition does not outline roles of the public sec-
tor, omits the collaborative aspect, does not inform of the alleged skills transfer, the 
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empowerment of the previously disadvantaged, and innovation. Brinkerhoff and 
Brinkerhoff (2011; cited by Zhang et al., 2015) warn against function-specific defi-
nitions as being of little help in delineating the key features of PPP. Using an inte-
grated approach, Zhang et al. (2015) proposed redefining the PPP as a strategy that 
is utilized to provide quality infrastructure facilities only possible with total active 
commitment from both public and private partners. Just like in alliancing, a PPP 
needs public sector with internal expertise to underline infrastructure opportunities, 
manage and monitor its implementation, and facility management agency capacity 
at post concession stage.
Global experience indicate that PPP has been promoted as an alternative procure-
ment method (Ahmadabadi & Heravi, 2019b; Reynaers & Parrado, 2017; van 
Marrewijk et al., 2008) which offers immense benefits to the public sector by increas-
ing value for money, economic growth, employment, and project management 
(Carbonara et al., 2014; Orzes et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2016). According to Macário 
et al. (2015), the expectation was that compared to traditional procurement models, 
PPP would facilitate improved quality, effectiveness, and greater efficiency for infra-
structure development; by taking advantage of private management experience, com-
petitive pressure in the allocation of contracts, and transference of most of the 
investment risk to the private sector side. National Treasury (2018) identified PPP as 
one of the pillars to infrastructure development in South Africa and out of R834.1 bil-
lion planned for public sector infrastructure spending over a period of 3 years, PPP 
projects accounted for R18.5 billion or 2.2%. DBSA’s (2012) report on the state of 
SA’s economic structure established that lack of sufficient governance framework was 
one of the causes for the decline in infrastructure development with only 25 number of 
closed off PPP undertaken using treasury regulations. It is, however, worth noting that 
the 25 number of closed off PPP projects reported by government technical advisory 
center was different to the 33 projects published by National Treasury, which includes 
projects undertaken by South African National Roads Agency, a schedule two entity 
and hence not subjected to treasury regulations. According to Osei-Kyei and Chan 
(2015), SA PPPs are undertaken using various models and majority of the infrastruc-
ture projects are bundled with attaining financial benefits thereby overshadowing 
innovation and skills transfer. Osei-Kyei and Chan (2015) further noted that obstacles 
of high transaction cost, lengthy procurement process, lack of appropriate skills, unat-
tractive financial market, incomplete risk transfer, and higher end-user charges have 
impeded full utilization of PPP.
As observed from the PPP Manual, South Africa also has established a robust regu-
latory framework in terms of which national and provincial government institutions 
can enter into PPP agreements. According to Arimoro (2018), the legislation that 
drives PPPs for national and provincial government is Treasury Regulation 16 issued 
to the Public Finance Management (PFMA) Act. However, it is worth highlighting 
that there has been a lack of studies that focus on the actual delivery framework of PPP 
and many research conducted in SA have failed to explore the application of HPPPA 
as a way of improving infrastructure delivery. There are many questions that still lin-
ger on whether the PPP has achieved its mandate in South Africa.
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Theoretical Context of PPP Delivery Framework
The South Africa Public-Private Partnership Manual (2004) identifies the PPP 
framework as pivotal in ensuring tasks are executed by partners according to the 
planned sequence, quality and duration. However, studies by De Schepper et al. 
(2015) established that PPPs are characterized by high transaction costs, the long 
duration for feasibility study, and procurement which causes projects to be delayed 
at early stages. Many researchers concur with De Schepper et al. (2015) and pro-
posed various framework reviews that could enable the PPP framework to become 
more efficient in infrastructure delivery. Table 1 provides a selected list of similar 
research studies that have come close to exploring shortfalls of PPP in SA. In as 
much as they provide an in-depth study on SA PPP, these have mostly focused on 
isolated elements of PPP but failed to holistically review the performance of its 
framework against set objective needed in closing the infrastructure gap as outlined 
in National Development Plan 2030. In addition, none of the researchers focused on 
reviewing the SA PPP framework with the aim of remolding it as an HPPPA. 
Furthermore, their studies failed to analyze the operations and maintenance of infra-
structure during the post concession period. Zhang et al. (2016) critical review of 
PPP publications from selected Chinese journals recommended that holistic and 
pragmatic research on PPP management is still necessary due to increased construc-
tion industry growth and complexity of infrastructure projects.
It is also particularly important to clarify the success factors of PPP. Without a com-
mon understanding of success factors for PPP, monitoring and controlling their perfor-
mance effectively becomes problematic. Therefore, the identification of appropriate 
success factors is important for PPP stakeholders in SA, as they require specific and 
measurable frameworks for tracking and benchmarking the key outcomes of their 
project investments. As noted by Jaafar et al. (2020), ascertaining PPP projects critical 
success factors (CSFs) remains a challenge given the complex and typically highly 
customized nature of each project. For infrastructure projects, performance evaluation 
are even more compounded by existence of multiple contractual arrangements typi-
cally found in such projects (Jaafar et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2016). Consequently, no 
reliable statistical or meta-analytical model would accurately evaluate project perfor-
mance. While literature specific to CSFs in South African PPP in infrastructure proj-
ects remain scarce, a host of comparative studies from both developed and developing 
nations, exist on the subject, with divergent perspectives.
To examine infrastructure-based PPPs, a host of CSFs with several subordinate 
factors would need to be considered. Díaz (2020) suggested a binary classification 
of risks in infrastructure PPPs-that risks can be due to extrinsic factors or intrinsic 
factors (in relation to the project). Drawing evidence from Latin America and 
Caribbean countries, they concluded that project scale (size), sector of implemen-
tation (water and sanitation or transport), and investment in divested assets are key 
intrinsic causes of project failure. Extrinsic factors that are likely to guard against 
early termination include quality regulatory environment, presence of stable 
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This is a simple CSF classification based on the origin of the risk in relation to the 
project. Legal support and favorable political environment is predominantly cited 
as a primary (extrinsic) CSF in PPP in infrastructure projects. The subordinate 
success factors in this category include presence of comprehensive guidelines and 
controls for PPPs, commitment to the contract by both public and private actors, 
presence of compliance control mechanisms (Liu et al., 2016), stable political 
environment, and political goodwill in the PPPs and transparency (Ahmadabadi & 
Heravi, 2019a; Liu et al. (2016). Extending discourse on the role of political fac-
tors, both Yun et al. (2015) and Ahmadabadi and Heravi (2019a) found that gov-
ernment guarantee in supporting the project, previous experience in similar or 
related projects, and matching government-private sector objectives are related 
political factors associated with successful projects. Political CSFs can be viewed 
from risk management perspectives, in that supportive political environment and 
legal framework diminishes political and legal risks of the project. In South 
African context, assessment of political dimensions of CSFs should focus on the 
presence of supporting political structures and processes associated with infra-
structure PPPs, and the extent to which they encourage, guide, support, and con-
trol high perfuming infrastructural PPPs.
There is growing prominence of social and community support as a CSF in infra-
structural project. Projects with higher prospects of success when they promote 
environmental sustainability, support the local communities, are supported by the 
local communities (are consistent with the demands of the locals), supports local 
socio-economy—including job creation and align to public interest (Jaafar et al., 
2020; Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2015; Yun et al., 2015). The reviewed literature suggests 
that social considerations (social responsibility, community welfare, and public 
interest) are gaining special place in project sustainability, and that communities 
are increasingly gaining visibility during the planning and implementation of PPPs 
in infrastructure projects. Socio-economic standing of a PPP infrastructure project 
remains critical to South African context, considering the sociopolitical history of 
the nation. According to Larson (2020), entities seeking PPPs would be in privi-
leged position, and tip the project for success if they conformed to the Sullivan 
principles. These are a set of principles that seek to strengthen social and economic 
welfare of the South African communities, including: community investment, elim-
ination of discrimination, sponsoring social programs, promotion of education, and 
creation of employment opportunities. Socio-economic support should be integral 
part of CSFs evaluation for South African projects in that they grant a social license 
through winning public support.
A key shortcoming with the infrastructure PPPs CSF analysis in the extant litera-
ture is the scarcity of project stage-by stage analysis. Most infrastructure projects are 
multi-staged, and some CSFs could be stage specific (Jaafar et al., 2020). At the pre-
implantation stage, studies have identified procurement capability as a key success 
factor. Successful procurement is more likely where the specialists in private sector 
have a capability to undertake necessary procurement, and where it will be possible 
to acquire or procure equipment’s at the working site Ochieng et al. (2017). Liu 
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et al.’s (2016) comparative analysis (of China and Australia), identified in CSF in 
early stages of the PPPs arrangements (tendering stage). They found that project suc-
cess will depend on the quality reflected in the short project (used as the basis of 
projecting future completion), level of competition, governance structure, transpar-
ency in tendering, and public sector capability. The applicability of these factors in 
both developing and developed nations underscores the need for South African PPP 
management to consider wide range of issues, including structural issues (such as 
governance and competition), capability considerations, governance dynamics, and 
logistical dimensions (for instance, if there are short milestones prior to completing 
major milestones).
Proponents of PPP have lauded the delivery approach for leading to cost saving 
(Liu et al., 2016; Salamah, 2017; Tang et al., 2010; Ye et al., 2018) and relieving the 
public sector from management huddles thereby enabling them to focus on core com-
petencies (Bob, 2009; Clifton & Duffield, 2006; Osei-Kyei et al., 2017; Vining & 
Weimer, 2016). The Dartford Crossing for instance was the first PPP highway-related 
project in England to rely exclusively on private sector for financing, delivering, and 
facility operation. Granted that this was England’s first Design-Build-Finance-Operate 
(DBFO) highway project, AECOM (2007) still regarded the project as a success 
because it was delivered on time and within budget by the original DBFO consortium. 
Furthermore, Deloitte (2006) points out that PPP has shown a solid track record of 
meeting infrastructure projects timelines such as in Canada were a Terminal 3 project 
at the Toronto Pearson Airport was completed 18 months ahead of schedule. However, 
Haarhoof (2008) suggested that PPP contracting should not be viewed as a way of 
exonerating the public sector from its responsibility and a “coupon to save millions.” 
Despite sentiments expressed by some scholars that PPP is not another form of priva-
tization or commercialization of a public function De Schepper et al. (2015), argu-
ments have continued to be raised that PPP is another form of outsourcing, which 
favors a few and deprives the society in having a say in national facilities. However, 
Grimsey and Lewis (2005) dispel these sentiments citing that as with privatization, the 
government no longer has a direct role in ongoing operations, whereas, with PPP, it 
retains ultimate responsibility.
A Deloitte report on re-evaluating PPP as strategic alliances to resolve infrastruc-
ture crisis in SA, identified a list of perceived factors that cause PPPs to fail (Deloitte, 
2006). These included poor set-up, accountability, unclear project objectives, exces-
sive focus on transaction, inappropriate risk allocation model, political, lack of inter-
nal capacity, failure to release value for money, failure to release value for money, 
inadequate planning, legal and regulatory framework, and adopting a lifecycle per-
spective beyond the transaction. However, the list does not establish how the institu-
tion capacity affects the PPP at pre-registration and post concession phase and hence 
not exhaustive. While public entities have shown increasing interest in PPP it was 
recently observed that the private sectors are becoming reluctance in PPP bidding due 
to high transaction costs, unfair distribution, and projection of risks (Ahmadabadi & 
Heravi, 2019b; Liu et al., 2016; Roumboutsos & Chiara, 2010; The Australian 
Government, 2015; Zhang, 2005).
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For example, infrastructure expenditure through PPP in SA only accounted for 
4% due to the contrasting interests between the public and private sector Government 
Technical Advisory Centre (GTAC, 2017). Roehrich et al. (2014) conceded that the 
rising use of PPP in developing countries need to be nestled with exploring gaps 
that have led to slow progress in the delivery of projects. It was established that it 
is difficult to conclude that value-for-money, sustainability, and risk transfer has 
taken place on a PPP and that successful negotiation around the final measurement 
is critical to the success of PPP (KPMG, 2010; Lapan et al., 2012; Public-Private 
Partnership Unit [PPPU], 2007). Partners in a PPP have different and complemen-
tary but not common interests as the public sector and private sectors are “diverse 
actors” contractually bound to deliver “mutually agreed objectives” (Loxley, 2013; 
Zhang, 2005). Public-private partnerships need to go beyond the transactional 
nature to adopting a life-cycle perspective by getting stakeholder buy-in, managing 
the change process, correctly allocating risk, developing the legislative, and regula-
tory framework (Loxley, 2013; Petersen, 2010). There is a need to close the loop-
holes in the framework, discard repeating roles and bring back the public sector as 
champions of the management process as they are stuck with the infrastructure 
facility for a lifetime. Walker and Jacobsson (2014) argued that the dilemma caused 
by rigidity of PPP contracts to integrate the flexibility of specifying performance 
has increased research interest in finding a balance between adopting a “hands-off” 
and relational “hands-on” approach whereby the needed expertise can be marshaled 
effectively without compromising the project intent. The next section details the 
research method and symposium of key findings drawn from the participants. This 
is followed by a discussion, conclusion, and recommendations.
Method
The nature of the research problem and the study area influenced the choice of research 
design. Thus, the research took consideration of the complexity and uniqueness of the 
topic in arriving at the research approach used and only selected participants with 
experience in PPP management as they were deemed to be exposed to an understand-
ing of the intricate PPP frameworks and legislations. In as much as there were closed 
off PPP projects in SA, lack of HPPPA ones would have rendered quantitative method 
incomplete as only figures for PPP would have been collected. Interpretivism enabled 
the researcher’s to understand the differences between humans in their role as social 
actors, which were crucial to adopting an empathetic stance by entering a social world 
of research subjects from their point of view (Saunders et al., 2015). This was contrary 
to positivism, which adopts a philosophical stance of natural scientism, realism which 
was scientific inquiry based on senses and pragmatism premised on believe that there 
is no single reality as all individuals have unique interpretations of reality. It is impor-
tant to stress that there were no variables (independent or predefined) or hypotheses to 
test during this research. Rather, akin to Gerring (2009) the research aimed to produce 
an in-depth understanding of the social context of a particular phenomenon. In this 
case, the extent to which current PPP practices can be enhanced to enable practitioners 
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in SA to deliver future PPP projects more efficiently. For this reason, qualitative 
research method utilized, enabled the researchers to gain deeper insight into the per-
formance of PPP in SA. From a philosophical viewpoint, this research adopted the 
interpretative philosophical stance because the researchers wanted to study HPPP 
context-specific and processes aligned to SA project delivery. Secondly, the interpreta-
tive approach was well-suited for exploring hidden reasons behind complex, interre-
lated HPPP processes, such as interdepartmental politics, where quantitative evidence 
may be biased, inaccurate or difficult to obtain. Third, the interpretative approach was 
found to be useful in theory elaboration, especially in areas where there was insuffi-
cient priori theory. Nathaneal (2014) argued that unlike quantitative method, qualita-
tive research method was found to be flexible and allowed participants to freely 
express themselves resulting in data rich in the textual content. The research relied on 
participants from different aspects within the construction sector and had PPP experi-
ence in SA, this led to a diverse perspective. The explanatory strategy of inquiry was 
used to establish “what” caused a low number of PPP projects undertaken using trea-
sury regulations 16 and “what” could be done to achieve efficient results as a building 
theme to gaining deeper insight on the effect of introducing HPPPA. The research 
strategy further sought to understand the cause of the public sector seeking an exten-
sion of concession periods despite claims that the advantage of a PPP was imparting 
skills and empowerment.
As the phenomena of HPPPA was relatively new and untested in SA, the research 
used an induction design that made an observation as a point of departure in order to 
come up with a theoretical framework. The qualitative multi-method strategy of 
exploratory interviews and case study was chosen for empirical investigation in line 
with the research aim. Interviews were deemed more appropriate for this research as 
they go beyond tabulating of figures to creating deeper conversations with profession-
als’ experienced in PPP. Exploratory interviews presented an opportunity for probing 
phenomena by collecting rich and detailed data, which added significance and depth 
to the research. After gaining in-depth exploration view of the participants’ experience 
on the PPP framework, the researchers went step further and identified case studies 
that were appropriate in tapping lessons that spoke to the research aim and objectives. 
The literature review established that there was no accord in the definition of both PPP 
and alliancing leading to different implementation interpretation, which resulted in 
exploring a more neutral framework of HPPPA that eliminates the shortfalls in both 
frameworks. In as much as HPPPA has not been used before in SA, the case study 
seeks to provide an in-depth understanding of the research problem.
The multi-method research strategy employed a two-stage choice that investigated 
the performance of PPP in SA for delivering infrastructure. The first stage used semi-
structured, face-to-face and one-to-one interviews with professionals from various 
sectors of the construction sector vested with experience in SA PPP. The outcome of 
this first stage helped in identifying particular case studies executed that presented 
interesting framework implementation in line with the research aim. The case study 
used open-ended, telephone interviews that enabled participants to freely express 
themselves without being confined to a list of questions.
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Data Collection
Semi-structured interviews were used as a first stage of data collection. The research 
interview sampled individual professional participants based on their experience in 
PPP infrastructure projects in SA. The participants engaged were those who had been 
involved in the project contractual management level and thus aware of the PPP con-
tract intricacies. It was anticipated that the interviewee’s rich background, knowledge 
and technical skills on implementation on PPP projects in SA would provide an in-
depth contribution to the research objectives (Nathaneal, 2014). Figure 1 shows a sam-
pling frame allocated in strata from which sampling units were drawn as follows:
■  Private partner: consisting of the special purpose vehicle, contract works exe-
cution entities, professional consultants, and facility managers;
■  Public partners: consists of the public institution, public-private partnership 
unit, and national treasury advisors;
■  Transaction advisors: independent experts engaged by a public institution to 
advise on the financial, contractual and technical aspect of PPP.
Despite a limited number of the sample population, both simple random (probabil-
ity) and purposive/judgmental (non-probability) sampling methods were used in 
selecting the sampling units from closed-off SA PPP. Simple random sampling was 
restricted to technical advisors from the PPP unit, as its sample population was known. 
However, the purposive sampling method was used on the rest of the sampling units. 
Care was taken in targeting participants that had at least 5 years’ experience in high-
level management of PPP and hence exposed to contractual matters. Table 2 below 
Figure 1. Sampling frame.
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shows the sample population, targeted and actual sample size selected from each stra-
tum. The sample size depended on individuals that were accessible and expressed 
willingness to participate in the research and the actual sample size comprised of those 
that participated in the actual research.
Prior to interviews, a briefing and consent letter was sent to each participant. 
Despite some participants not concerned with revealing their identity, it was resolved 
to allocate them with a code for easy sorting of data as per Table 3.
The research ensured that the identity of participants was concealed and replaced 
with code letters aligned to the strata. Compiled and coded data was then referred back 
to participants for confirmation.
Case Study Data Collection and Sample Size
After establishing contact with participants for stage one interviews, the researchers 
were able to identify those that participated in selected case studies. Case studies used 
unstructured interviews for data collection. The difference was that while the semi-
structured interviews were based on a general overview of PPP framework in SA, 
unstructured interviews narrowed the investigation to the two case studies thereby 
providing a deeper and more understanding of the respondents’ experience in refer-
ence to particular projects.
Analysis
The themes presented critical red flags identified that would lead to a successful imple-
mentation of infrastructure once addressed through HPPPA. Themes were used in ana-
lyzing each interview’s transcript. A challenge presented with this kind of analysis was 
Table 2. Interview Participants.
Participants












Consists of a public 
institution, PPP 
unit and national 
treasury advisors
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how to avoid biases in linking the theme to participants’ response, which was overcome 
by interview outcomes. After the thematic analysis, the outcome was presented graphi-
cally. The research used the following methods to establish its validation and credibility. 
Purposive sampling: in addition to simple random sampling, the research used purposive 
which was characterized by selecting sampling units based on specific purposes associ-
ated with answering research questions. This allowed the researchers to focus on key 
informants who were knowledgeable in the field of study and provided greater in-depth 
findings. Triangulation: triangulation helped the researchers to reduce bias and cross-
examined the integrity of participants’ responses (Anney, 2014). Among the many meth-
ods of triangulation, the following two were utilized:
■  Triangulation of sources (informant’s triangulation): the research drew its 
respondents from various sectors of the construction industry that participated 
in SA PPP whose responses were crosschecked against the other.
■  Theoretical triangulation (variety of data collection methods): the research used 
the qualitative multi-method strategy of semi-structured interviews and case 
studies whose data findings and interpretations were compared. Themes and 
categories that emerged in one interview were verified in subsequent inter-
views and case studies in order to check the credibility of propositions.
Results
As highlighted in the previous section, primary data collected was organized in a series 
of similar statements, and then allocated to corresponding themes that were coded. 
Themes depicted a broader discussion of topics established using secondary data and 
refined to include consideration from primary data. The segmented data followed the 
themes as per Table 4 below.
Table 3. Coded Research Respondents.
Strata Strata code Respondent roles Respondent codes









Transaction advisors TRA Financial advisor TRA01
Cost management TRA02
PPP research professor TRA03
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The themes in Table 5 were further expanded to detailed sub-categories based on 
respondents’ responses that were similar in nature. As indicated in the method section, 
participants were allocated in strata coded as follows, which were used in tabulating 
themes:
Participant Code Key
■ Private sector PRS
■ Public sector PUS
■ Transaction advisors TRA
Theme Code 1: Dormant PUS
The literature reviewed established shortfalls in the public sector’s participation in the 
PPP processes. Zhang et al. (2015) pointed out that there was still a need to develop an 
institutional environment that would enable PPP projects success. Deloitte (2006) con-
ceded that a number of PPP projects had failed due to poor setup, too much focus on 
transaction and public sector’s lack of internal capacity. Table 6 shows a summary of 
research responses to the management capacity of the public sector.
As can be seen in Table 5 the majority of participants viewed political factors as the 
main cause for lack of project registration and in some instances termination. They 
cited cancellation of the prisons bid that was at the procurement stage leading to huge 
loss in transaction cost as one of the typical cases. The participants further alleged that 
public institutions lacked capacity and experience in infrastructure development, 
which resulted in significant reliance on transaction advisors. The other shortfall 
established was the spectator nature of the PPP unit and national treasury as their role 
was limited to advisory and approval of stages respectively. However, Deloitte (2006) 
Table 4. Coding of Themes.
Theme code Code name Description
1. Dormant public 
management
Management capacity of public sector institutions, 
as well as the role, played by national treasury and 
PPP unit.
2. Prolonged feasibility 
study and complex 
documentation
Feasibility studies impacted on project success and 
the way documents were structured.
3. Contracting and 
implementation
The stage at which the public sector was engaged, 
the process and hurdles of bringing them on board.
4. Skills transfer and 
empowerment
Analyzed if some of the alluded advantages of PPP 
such as innovation and transfer skills were attained.
5. Usability of 
the proposed 
framework
Aimed at highlighting the respondents’ experiences 
on the PPP framework and their perceptions on 
the proposed HPPPA contract.
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argued that external advisors do not exonerate the public sector’s responsibilities, as 
many tasks cannot be outsourced which require their active participation. Interesting 
from the empirical findings was that only 46% of participants cited lack of capital 
finance as the main cause for project failure, which was similar to sentiments expressed 
by Walker and Jacobsson (2014) who observed that a PPP only hide the capital cost by 
taking it off the balance sheet and redefining it as a fee for service still payable by the 
public sector.
Theme code 2: Prolonged Feasibility Study and Complex 
Documentation
Theme 2 was based on understanding how feasibility studies, which formed a core 
basis for formulating PPP documentations affected its efficiency. Table 6 summarizes 
the respondents’ view.
Despite literature reviewed on PPPU (2007) case study for case (A) alluding that 
rigorous feasibility study sets clear parameters and simplifies procurement, the find-
ings in Table 9 established that majority of participants regarded the recommendations 
formulated at feasibility study as the cause for inefficiency, as they were benchmarked 
Table 5. Theme 1 Outcome.
Statement summary
Respondents (out of 13 total interviewed)
Code Percentage
Spending public institution lacks 
commitment and capacity.
PRS01, TRA01, PUS01, PRS03, PUS02, 
TRA03, PUS04, PRS04, PUS05
69
National treasury and PPP unit 
advisors limited powers (lacks 
enforcement).
TRA03, PUS01, PUS02, PRS05, PUS04 39
Project officers not given more 
power lacks experience and user 
buy-in.
PUS05, TRA03 15
Lacks internal team and heavily 
reliant on transaction advisor’s
PUS05, PRS01, PUS01 23
Lack of political will and political 
interference
TRA01, TRA02, TRA03 PRS03, PUS01, 
PUS03, PRS01, PUS04, PUS05, PUS02
77
Change of public institution 
personnel
PUS03 8
Failure to proceed has little to do 
with finance.
PUS01, PUS02, PUS03 TRA01, PRS04, 
PRS02
46
Public sector engaging transaction 
advisors duplicates roles and cost
PRS02 8
Conflict of interest when the 
private sector owns shares in 
infrastructure developed
PRS02 8
16 Public Works Management & Policy 00(0)
on foreign context which was unrealistic to the local environment, rarely attained and 
lacked the input of the private sector. One of the participants from national treasury 
cited that in their years of working as the PPP approving officer, they had not seen a 
single project initially registered as a PPP that had recommended a different contract-
ing system in feasibility study outcome. They also viewed the feasibility study as 
costly to both the public and private sector in contrast to formulated documents that 
were alleged to be rigid with inappropriate risk transfer. Majority of participants cited 
the major risk of underground oil on the department of trade and industry site and 
extensive existence of dolomite on Gautrain, only established after the engagement of 
the private sector and not at the feasibility study. Despite being involved from the 
inception, public institutions were viewed as the main initiators of variations due to 
change in requirements at an advanced stage of the project, which tied with the views 
expressed in Table 7 on lack of public institution capacity. These findings were similar 
Table 6. Theme 2 Outcome.
Statement summary
Respondents (out of 13 total interviewed)
Code Percentage
Wrong intention for PPP registration PUS01, PUS05, PUS02 23
Feasibility study highly costly and time-
consuming
PUS01, TRA02, TRA03, PUS02, 
PUS03, PUS04, PUS05
54
Lack of adequate consultation to get 
user buy-in
TRA03, 8
Lack of standard feasibility study format PUS01 8
Unrealistic feasibility study 
recommendations of what constitutes 
value for money and affordability
PUS01, PUS02, PUS03, PUS04, 
PUS05, PRS01, PRS03, PRS04, 
TRA01, TRA02, PUS03
85
Rigidity (inflexible) of documents TRA01, TRA02, PUS02, PUS03, 
PUS04, PRS03
46
Public sector instructing private partner 
on the specification
PRS01 8
Public sector equity (financial) 
contribution exposes them to risks
TRA01, PUS01, PUS03, PUS04, 31
Used on inappropriate projects TRA01, TRA02, PUS04, PRS01 31
Biding of the single project rather 
multiple ones costly and time-
consuming.
TRA01 8
Unsuccessful and inappropriate risk 
transfer
PRS01, PRS03, TRA01, TRA03, 
PUS05, PUS01, PUS02
54
Variations caused by change in user 
requirements
TRA01, TRA02, PRS02, PRS03, 
PRS04,
39
Failure to disclose all costs associated 
with PPP (contingency liability and 
high repayment interest)
PUS05, PRS04 15
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to the literature reviewed which pointed out that it was difficult for public and private 
sector representatives to contractually integrate flexibility into contract documents 
while maintaining the integrity of intent (Walker & Jacobsson, 2014). Mokanse (2017) 
established that in some cases, value for money analysis was applied to projects that 
had already been decided as PPP even before conducting a feasibility study.
Theme Code 3: Contracting Implementation Flow
The literature reviewed pointed out that in as much as selecting the “right” team in 
PPP project was critical, building good relationships, and working collaboratively 
was equally important (Anney, 2014; Ke et al. (2009); Mokanse, 2017). Theme 3 
Table 7. Theme 3 Outcome.
Statement summary
Respondents (out of 13 total interviewed)
Code Percentage
Failure to make decisions by assigned 
personnel
PUS01 8
Ineffective management and 
procurement system
TRA02, TRA03, PUS02 23
View PPP as outsourcing PRS01, PUS02, TRA02, TRA03 31
High transaction cost PUS02, TRA01, TRA02, 
TRA03, PRS01, PRS03
46
Cancellation (termination) of projects 
before closing off
TRA03, PUS01, PUS02, PUS03, 
PRS01
39
Negotiation after competitive 
tendering compromise terms.
PUS04, PRS01, PUS02, TRA01 31
Failure to reach agreement PUS01, PUS05, TRA02, PRS01, 
PRS02
39
Lack of trust TRA03, PRS04 15
Misunderstanding on innovation 
between parties
TRA01, PRS01, TRA03, PRS03 31
Project needs to be viable to attract 
right private sector
TRA01 8
Public sector lacks of knowledge and 
monitoring
PRS01, TRA01, PUS02, PRS05 31
Advisors report to the institution and 
not PPP unit
TRA01, PUS01 15
Transaction advisor stages were costly 
and delay projects
PUS03, PUS04, PRS01 31
Funds locked for a longer time 
prevents private sector participation.
PRS02, PRS03 15
Amicable settlement of disputes helps 
the project.
PRS04, PRS05 15
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identified major gaps in procurement of private sector and project implementation 
process as shown in Table 7. Majority of participants cited prolonged procurement 
process, which led to high transaction costs with no compensation for losers and 
disagreements during negotiations such as on department of trade and industry 
office accommodation project. Having negotiations with the preferred bidder after 
a rigorous bidding process was viewed as similar to “re-writing” the bid docu-
ments. One would argue that a bidder could arbitrary make unrealistic proposals at 
the bidding stage knowing they would later negotiate their way out. Despite this, 
the literature reviewed established that the National Treasury (2018) expressed 
unrealized aspirations of increasing PPP project pipeline by streamlining imple-
mentation process to reduce the project duration by making regulatory framework 
less difficult for both parties. In as much as PPP was alluded as a sphere for innova-
tion, 31% of participants cited that innovation was restricted to public sectors 
affordability and different understanding on what was viewed as constituting value 
for money. There was also a lack of trust between parties with some public entities 
viewing PPP as a form of outsourcing or privatization Grimsey and Lewis (2005) 
despite dismissing the claims (De Schepper et al., 2015).
Walker and Jacobsson (2014) sentiments were similar to this research finding that 
the outsourced hands-off approach exposed the public sector to opportunistic behav-
ior through transaction cost and unreasonably priced bids. In Liu et al. (2016) find-
ings, they established that the success of a PPP was largely based on the performance 
of the procurement process, which should be managed by both public and private 
parties’ engagement.
Theme Code 4: Skills Transfer and Empowerment
Theme 4 examined claims made in the literature that PPP leads to skill transfer and 
empowerment of previously disadvantaged. Contrary to Maseko’s (2014) finding that 
a PPP allows the public sector to overcome skills shortage by using private sector 
resources and South African Budget Review (SABR, 2018) claims that national trea-
sury was aware of the public sector’s need for internal skills on PPP projects, empirical 
evidence in Table 8 below shows that skills transfer and empowerment were seldom 
achieved.
Majority of the participants attributed the lack of skilled personnel to the public 
sector’s inability to provide and retain trainees throughout the project lifecycle, which 
impacted on the establishment of a capable public institution facility management 
agency. Majority of participants viewed the Gautrain facility management agency as 
the only agency that would be capable of operating and maintaining the facility at 
post concession stage while projects such as Inkosi Albert Luthuli hospital were 
fighting to extend their concession period. The literature reviewed on DIIS (2015) 
showed that developing and retaining skills within public institutions was challeng-
ing due to private sectors more attractive working conditions and hence one could 
suggest that countries wanting to implement PPP often faced considerable public 
sector capacity challenges.
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Theme Code 5: Usability of the Proposed PPP 
Framework
In line with this study aim, the preceding themes were a build up to the core of the 
research, which was nestled in understanding the shortfall of PPP framework and how 
it could be made more efficient by introducing HPPPA framework. Table 9 provides 
the participants view on PPP alliance and HPPP alliance.
SABR (2018) claimed that SA had considerable experience in establishing success-
ful PPP’s, with a sound regulatory framework, which was similar to the empirical 
evidence from the majority of participants who pointed out that there was nothing 
wrong with the SA PPP legislation and framework. However, there was a contradic-
tion in their response as the same participants in favor of current SA PPP framework 
admitted that its delivery system was complex and tedious especially for the develop-
ing country like SA. There was also a mix up in understanding between framework 
and legislation, which were used interchangeably. Despite alliancing not used, it was 
established that there were instances where projects were partly funded by the public 
sector, which worked more like an HPPP. In addition, participants were of the view 
that having an HPPPA framework would need a change in legislation, which SA has 
never done since the ratification of treasury regulations. Participants further pointed 
out that regardless of the framework chosen, the critical was to have capable public 
institutions that would be actively involved in monitoring and able to operate the facil-
ity at post concession stage. WEF (2014) argued that while building new infrastructure 
assets ranked high on global agenda, governments often neglected their existing 
Table 8. Theme 4 Outcome.
Statement summary
Respondents (out of 13 total interviewed)
Code Percentage
Unavailability of trainees TRA01, PUS02, PUS03 23
Failure to accommodate skills transfer TRA02, PUS02, PRS03, PUS03 31
Institutions struggle to retain trained 
personnel
TRA01, TRA03, PUS05, 
PUS03, PUS01, TRA03
46
Public institutions fail to attract 
qualified personnel
PUS02 8
View empowerment as a stumbling 
block to PPP success
PRS01, TRA03 15
Lack of similar projects to track 
learning experience.
TRA03 8
Government technical advisory center 
PPP training courses lack industrial 
exposure
TRA02, PUS02 15
Lack of established facility management 
agency capable of operating a project 
for post concession
TRA01, PUS04, PUS02, PUS03 31
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infrastructure assets and often fail to maximize their operation as well as meet ade-
quate user quality standards.
Unification of Themes
From the participants responses tabulated in themes above, it was deduced that 46% was 
the median value of gaps in the proposed PPP framework cited as shown in Table 10.
Moreover, the empirical findings above median value in Table 10 were presented 
graphically to indicate bottlenecks, which were viewed by the majority of participants 
as inhibiting the success of PPP infrastructure projects as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 above shows that feasibility study recommendations were ranked as the 
highest cause of project failure. In addition, it could be argued that feasibility study 
had a knock on effect on other bottlenecks presented in the above figure such as high 
transaction cost, the rigidity of documents, unsuccessful, and inappropriate risk trans-
fer as well as project cost and duration based on its recommendations. This was fol-
lowed by political causes and spending institutions lack of capacity and commitment. 
Table 9. Theme 5 Outcome.
Statement summary
Respondents (out of 13 total interviewed)
Code Percentage
Good South Africa PPP framework and 
regulatory system though complex and 
tedious.
PRS01, PRS03, TRA01, TRA02, 
TRA03, PUS02, PUS03, 
PUS04
62
Lack of PPP sign off and financial closure 
in the past 5 years meant no recent 
lessons learnt on PPP
PRS01, PRS03, PUS03, PUS04 
PUS05, TRA01, TRA02
54
Failure by the national treasury to review 
regulation
PUS01, PUS02, PUS03, PUS04, 
PUS05
39
The public sector is incapable of managing 
regardless of the contract system
TRA01, PRS04 15
No alliancing used in SA infrastructure 
projects.
TRA03, TRA01, TRA02, 
PUS05, PRS03
39
Open to introducing another contracting 
system such as HPPPA.
TRA02, TRA03, PUS01, 
PUS02, PUS03, PUS04, 
PUS05, PRS01, PRS03
69
HPPPA would need a change of legislation PUS01, PUS02, PUS03, PUS04, 
TRA01, PRS03, PRS04
31
Table 10. Themes Outcome Median Value. 
Median
Respondents responses in percentage from themes 8 15 23 31 39 46 54 62 69 77 85
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Despite respondents citing that the SA PPP framework was good, 69% were open to 
trying other contracting systems.
Discussion
The two case studies and interviews established that SA PPP framework could be 
meant to work more efficiently once loopholes in public sector participation were 
resolved and the project lifecycle phases revisited. The findings of this empirical study 
are in line with Liu et al. (2016) who argued that public institutions lacked skills, 
expertise, and capacity hence needed a central role to be played by the PPP unit 
throughout the project lifecycle. The Australian Government (2015) proposed estab-
lishing an effective team culture such as in alliancing that should have the capability 
to engage with partners on an equal footing, fully understand risks sharing implica-
tions and opportunities. Majority of participants pointed out that attempt to revise the 
SA PPP framework would need the amendment to the legislature, which SA has never 
done since its enactment in 1999. The literature reviewed cited previous discussions 
aimed at having a hybrid infrastructure delivery system but only looked at developing 
various PPP financing models (National Treasury, 2016; OECD, 2016) and not holistic 
limitations of the proposed PPP framework. It was further established that there were 
alliancing principals infused in some PPP projects such as the public sector’s capital 
contribution, bid negotiation and amicable settlement of disputes, which worked more 
like an HPPPA. However, the majority of participants’ main concern was the unrealis-
tic feasibility study, political factors, and public sector capacity.
The literature established that having an HPPPA in infrastructure delivery would 
result in capable and actively involved public institutions throughout the project 
lifecycle and at post concession stage. Empirical evidence further proposed a change 
in the management process that should give the PPP unit more power in the 
Figure 2. Integration of theme results above the median.
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implementation of PPP and sound institutions with management capabilities that 
could be achieved through HPPPA. There should be a more transparent and efficient 
procurement process that allows sufficient competition at the start of the process. A 
HPPPA should enable managerial strategic fit by attaining buy-in of each party’s 
expectations and responsibilities upfront thereby fostering reciprocal understanding 
of each other’s cultural perspective. A HPPPA should further foster efficient alloca-
tion rather than transferring risks. The literature reviewed from Deloitte (2006) and 
SABR (2018) further proposed repacking of the PPP lifecycle phases and merging 
of the national treasury approval processes, which would assist in reducing cost, 
duration and increase collaboration between partners.
The results of semi-structured interviews showed that majority of participants 
viewed the proposed PPP framework as good despite being too complex and rigorous. 
The perceived complex nature may have been attributed to a limited understanding 
from some participants between the framework. Despite participants’ admission that a 
pure alliance has never been used in SA infrastructure development, there were ele-
ments of alliancing in some projects that were infused in a PPP such as the public 
sector’s capital contribution and the negotiation process. The downside of the negotia-
tion done in the SA PPP was that it did not start from the same wavelength between 
parties as the documents were prepared without the input of the private sector and later 
meant to negotiate which exposed them to challenges of lack of agreement. The par-
ticipants’ main concern was that the lack of efficiency in public infrastructure delivery 
would not improve regardless of the framework used so long there were political fac-
tors that override legislation and framework.
The case study on the department of trade and industry showed a positive 
approach to PPP delivery with the collaborative nature adopted by parties, which led 
to the amicable settlement of disputes. Despite this, there was a lack of trust as estab-
lished in the procurement process by facility management agency for maintenance 
services. Both case studies further showed that there were variations initiated by 
user institutions late on projects and regardless of claims that PPP delivered quality 
compared to other contracting systems, it showed that risk of defects still existed. 
The feasibility study was established as having little impact on the project as its 
results and recommendations mismatched the preceding procurement and imple-
mentation phases. The lack of agreement during negotiations between the depart-
ment of trade and industry and preferred bidder showed that it was too risky leaving 
such an intricate stage way much into the project after too much commitment had 
been invested in the project by both parties.
Figure 3 above shows proposed principals of HPPPA framework pinned on a col-
laborative approach, empowering the PPP unit, and increase incentives in lieu of pen-
alties as follows: Collaborative approach: mutual contribution by both parties would 
make the public sector be actively engaged in the project delivery process of planning, 
management, and monitoring. There should be well-structured agreements that clearly 
outline the responsibility of both parties. Capacitate public institutions: there should 
be a competent and capable institution management agency in place backed by a man-
agement plan before project sign off. Public sector capital contribution: this will ensure 
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that the public sector is as equally engaged on the project as the private sector and 
reduce the cost of unitary repayment. Where possible, the public sector should provide 
100% financing of the project, achieved through long term planning as in, either way, 
the public sector still pays for infrastructure development. The build now and pay later 
does not come free and hence should be scrutinized to avoid unsubstantiated expenses, 
which increase the costs of a PPP. Empower the PPP unit: rather than playing a merely 
advisory role, the PPP unit should be given more power to take a central role in provid-
ing technical services on behalf of the public sector.
Risk allocation: the success of an HPPPA would depend on how risks are managed. 
Rather than risk transfer, there should be continuous engagement through the negotia-
tion of appropriate risk allocation. Increase incentives and amicable settlement: 
research findings showed that penalties do not really work even on PPP and that litiga-
tion damages the relationships. The study proposes an increase to incentives issued out 
upon successful completion of the task and only reimburse capital cost after the trans-
fer of the fully operational project. Exit gates: having exit gates after each phase would 
minimize private sector losses and public sector contingency liabilities, as only the 
cost for services rendered would be paid. Standardized documents and supplementary 
toolkits: provide supplementary toolkits for each infrastructure sector as a point of 
departure for documentation. This would assist in shortening the procurement process 
and cost in transaction advisor. However, the documents should be flexible and take 
into consideration future changes.
Figure 3. Determinants of the proposed hybrid private public partnership framework.
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Skills transfer: public sector should make available trainees who should be retained 
throughout the project lifecycle. It should, however, remain the private sector’s respon-
sibility to identify companies to be subcontracted for empowerment programs run by 
previously disadvantaged personnel and hence bare the losses or damages thereof. 
Bundling of similar projects: in order to ensure cost reduction and minimize time, it is 
recommended that multiple programs such as green energy that encompass many sim-
ilar projects in one bid be conducted. Political will: there should be the political will to 
spearhead projects toward a common goal and reduction in interference by ensuring 
that documentation is watertight and not open to manipulation and capacitate procur-
ing agencies. Merging of project phases: it is proposed that in order to reduce the dura-
tion and approval process of the public-private partnership HPPPA phases should be 
merged as shown in Figure 4 below.
Under the proposed HPPPA, a feasibility study should fall outside the PPP process 
and form part of the national infrastructure feasibility study, which would recommend 
projects to be implemented through the various contracting system including HPPPA. 
The danger of having a rigorous feasibility stage, as part of PPP was that it occurred 
after the project had already been registered by the national treasury as a PPP and only 
looked at its piecemeal achievement with less bundling. Once the project is referred to 
an HPPPA, it means there was a prior consideration of other contracting systems con-
ducted through a feasibility study. Furthermore, the feasibility study recommendation 
for HPPPA should be increased from only looking at the project passing three tests of 
value for money, affordability, and risk transfer to include innovation and skills trans-
fer. In addition, transaction advisors should only be involved at procurement and nego-
tiation phases due to intricate contractual considerations needed at those stages. It is 
worth noting that this would not replicate the roles in a traditional contracting system, 
as the mandate to deliver infrastructure and incentives would still be maintained.
Conclusion
This research was premised on investigating gaps and limitations in the SA PPP frame-
work and viability of reframing it as HPPPA, which would enable SA practitioners to 
deliver infrastructure more effectively and efficiently. The SABR (2018) established 
that while SA could identify successes on some delivered projects, expenditure through 
PPP only accounted for 4% by 2015. It was further established that there was a dire 
decrease in infrastructure development through PPP as it had been more than 5 years 
since SA had a closed-off PPP projects using treasury regulations 16 (SABR, 2018) 
exacerbated by many projects stuck in the early stages (GTAC, 2017). South Africa 
National Planning Commission (2012) indicates that infrastructure investment in rela-
tion to gross domestic product needed to grow between 21% and 30% in order to 
invigorate economic growth. This was supported by the National Development Plan 
2030 plan, which claimed that competitive infrastructure development, would contrib-
ute to steering the SA economy by 7% (SABR, 2018). However, there was a lack of 
studies that focused on the actual delivery framework of SA PPP while others failed to 
explore the application of HPPP alliance.
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Figure 4. Proposed merging of project phases.
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The empirical findings suggest that despite positive results achieved on the SA PPP 
framework and regulatory system, participants viewed the PPP process as complex, 
rigorous and highly costly marred with lack of political will to spearhead projects 
while in some cases, political interference led to projects cancellation. Both case stud-
ies further showed that there were variations initiated by user institutions late on proj-
ects and despite claims of quality facilities delivered compared to other contracting 
systems, risk of defects still exists in a PPP. Institutions had no management agencies 
in place capable of taking over the infrastructure at post concession while national 
treasury and PPP unit powers under treasury regulations were limited to advisory and 
approval roles. Despite both the literature reviewed and empirical evidence establish-
ing that pure alliancing had never been used in infrastructure development in SA, the 
literature proposed adopting alliancing principals of mutual and active commitment 
from both parties while the majority of participants were open to trying other contract-
ing systems. While alliancing could be used on any project type, it showed greater 
results on complex and mega projects were innovative ideas and skills sharing 
could be realized (Aladag & Isik, 2020; Badi & Pryke, 2015; Liang & Hu, 2018; 
Ng et al., 2010; Ochieng et al., 2017). Rather than removing the public partner as 
an actor, alliancing demanded to strengthen its capacities thereby achieving social 
and commercial viability that benefits both parties. However, the literature reviewed 
from Clifton and Duffield (2006) suggested that the no litigation or arbitration for 
dispute resolution in alliancing showed that it would neither be a panacea in resolv-
ing infrastructure delivery challenges faced by SA as the public sector lacked 
capacity, skills and experience.
As this was qualitative research, findings and conclusions could not be generalized 
as a representation of occurrences on all PPP infrastructure in SA. In addition, the 
research only reviewed PPP undertaken in SA under treasury regulations 16, thus 
excluded those undertaken by municipalities and schedule two entities, which fol-
lowed different regulations. In view of this, the research premised its validity on its 
qualitative nature characterized with in-depth insight from professionals experienced 
in PPP infrastructure construction industry. It is, however, worth noting that the draw-
ing of participants from various sectors within the construction industry enabled the 
research to be relatable to a wide spectrum especially to practitioners in the PPP infra-
structure contracting system such as national treasury, PPP unit, transaction advisor’s, 
private sector and public institutions. Despite lack of empirical evidence in the use of 
pure alliancing in SA, it was established that some of its principals were already incor-
porated on some PPP projects which majority of research participants cited as favor-
able for both parties. While the results of the research provided a reasonable argument 
for adopting a HPPPA system, it was observed that increasing the number of partici-
pants would have enabled wider representation.
Recommendations for further studies are as follows: The research established that 
empowerment of previously disadvantaged and skills transfer was a major component 
touted by the public sector as the main reason for pursuing a PPP contract. However, 
the benefits of empowerment remain a worry as results showed that in most of the 
closed-off PPP, the public sector had no established facility management agency 
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capable of operating and maintaining the infrastructure post concession period. 
Research should be conducted that establishes empirical evidence of the value of PPP 
in the empowerment of the public sector. In addition, the research has widely investi-
gated on the aspect of public sector management system and capacity which has been 
established as having an influence on the delivery of infrastructure in general and not 
only under PPP. It has also established the limited powers of the PPP unit whose role 
could merely be cited as window dressing as they remained ruthless with only an advi-
sory role. It is hence recommended that in order to ensure efficiency in infrastructure 
delivery, further research solely dedicated to investigating the public sector fragmented 
roles and capacity in PPP delivery framework should be conducted.
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